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Abstract
We study the functioning and possible breakdown of the interbank market due
to asymmetric information about counterparty risk. We allow for privately observed
shocks to the distribution of asset risk across banks after the initial portfolio of liq-
uid and illiquid investments is chosen. Our model generates several interbank market
regimes: 1) low interest rate spread and full participation; 2) elevated spread and ad-
verse selection; and 3) liquidity hoarding leading to a market breakdown. The regimes
are in line with observed developments in the interbank market before and during the
2007-09 nancial crisis. We use the model to discuss various policy responses.
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Neither the recent massive money injections, the coordinated lowering of interest
rates nor the use of public funds to recapitalize banks have done much to restart
interbank lending. This action did not solve the underlying problem preventing
interbank lending: extreme information asymmetry.
Financial Times, November 9, 2008
1 Introduction
Interbank markets play a key role in banksliquidity management and the transmission of
monetary policy. The interest rate in the unsecured three-month interbank market acts as
a benchmark for pricing xed-income securities throughout the economy. In normal times,
interbank markets are among the most liquid in the nancial sector. Since August 2007,
however, the functioning of interbank markets has become severely impaired around the
world. As the nancial crisis deepened in September 2008, liquidity in the interbank market
has further dried up as banks preferred hoarding cash instead of lending it out even at
short maturities. Central banksmassive injections of liquidity did little to restart interbank
lending. The failure of the interbank market to redistribute liquidity has become a key
feature of the 2007-09 crisis (see, for example, Allen and Carletti, 2008, and Brunnermeier,
2009).
Why has the interbank market been dysfunctional for so long? What frictions can explain
these developments? How do they relate to the roots of the nancial crisis? In particular,
how can the illiquidity of banksassets depress activity in what used to be one of the most
liquid markets? And how do the policy responses that are discussed or implemented around
the world hold up against these frictions?
This paper provides a model of the unsecured interbank market with asymmetric infor-
mation about counterparty risk. Various regimes in the interbank market arise depending
on the level and distribution of counterparty risk. In the rst regime, there is full participa-
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tion of borrowers and lenders in the interbank market. The market functions smoothly and
interest rates are low despite the presence of asymmetric information. Riskier banks exert
an externality on safer banks as the latter subsidize the liquidity of the former. But the cost
is small compared to the cost of alternatives to the unsecured market. In the second regime,
the interbank market is characterized by adverse selection. The externality on safer banks is
too costly and they leave the unsecured market. Liquidity is still traded but the interest rate
rises since only riskier banks are active in the market. In the third regime, the interbank
market breaks down. This happens either because lenders prefer to hoard liquidity instead
of lending it out to an adverse selection of borrowers (lack of supply), or because even riskier
borrowers nd the unsecured interest rate too high and choose to obtain liquidity elsewhere
(lack of demand).
The three regimes derived in our model line up well with the observed developments.
Figure 1 plots the spread between the three-month unsecured rate and the overnight index
swap in three monthstime,1 a standard measure of interbank market tensions (red line),
and the amounts of liquidity parked by banks at the ECB (light and dark blue bars). Until
August 9, 2007 (the start of the nancial crisis), the unsecured euro interbank market is
characterized by a very low spread, around ve basis points, and innitesimal amounts of
liquidity parked at the ECB. In normal times, banks prefer to lend out excess cash since the
rate o¤ered by the ECBs overnight deposit facility is punitive relative to rates available in
interbank markets. The phase between August 9, 2007 and the last weekend of September,
2008 is characterized by a signicantly higher spread, yet there is still no parking of funds
(except the 2007 year-end e¤ect). As of September 28, 2008, the spread increases even
further to a maximum of 186 basis points. But the distinguishing feature of this phase is
a dramatic increase in the amounts banks bring to the ECB. The amounts increase more
than 1800-fold between the week of September 1, 2008 and the week of September 29, 2008.2
1The overnight index swap is a measure of what the market expects the overnight unsecured rate to be
over a three-month period and thus controls for interest rate expectations.
2The amounts deposited with the ECB rise from a daily average of e0.09 billion in the week starting
September 1, 2008 to e169.41 billion in the week of September 29, 2008. The ECB only announced a more
2
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Figure 1: Interbank spread, recourses to the ECB deposit facility (daily average per week), and
liquidity-absorbing open market operations (daily average per week), 01/2007 - 04/2009.
Banks are hoarding liquidity rather than lending it out. A similar pattern of three distinct
phases can be observed in the spread for the United States (Figure 2).3
The transition across various regimes in our model implies a change in the underlying level
and distribution of counterparty risk that is consistent with the development of actual events:
a sharp market-wide reassessment of risk in the summer of 2007, after subprime-mortgage
backed securities were discovered in portfolios of banks and bank-sponsored conduits, and
a further increase in the level and the dispersion of counterparty risk following the events
in September 2008. Asymmetric information as an underlying friction can also rationalize
the prolonged nature of interbank market tensions, despite an unprecedented increase in the
liquidity provision by central banks.
We model the interbank market in the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Banks
may need to realize cash quickly due to demands of customers who draw on committed
lines of credit or on their demandable deposits. Banks in need of liquidity can borrow from
extensive provision of liquidity on October 8, 2008. It was partially implemented a day later and came into
full force on October 15. We examine the events in September and October 2008 in more detail in Section 4.
3The spread in the interbank market secured by mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in the US followed a
similar pattern, albeit at lower levels.
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Figure 2: Interbank spreads US and euro area, 01/2007 - 04/2009
banks with a surplus of liquidity as in Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Bhattacharya and
Fulghieri (1994). Banksprotable but illiquid assets are risky. Hence, banks may not be able
to repay their interbank loan. The novel feature we add is asymmetric information about
counterparty risk.4 Banks become privately informed about the risk of their illiquid assets
after they chose the portfolio of liquid and illiquid investments. Asymmetric information
about counterparty risk creates frictions in the interbank market as suppliers of liquidity
protect themselves against lending to lemons.
Our modelling assumptions are designed to reect the insights from broad analyses of the
2007-09 nancial crisis. First, asymmetric information about the size and location of risk,
and the accompanying fear of counterparty default, which was created by the complexity
of securitization, are at the heart of the nancial crisis (see Gorton, 2008, 2009). Second,
maturity mismatch is a key factor contributing to the fragility of modern nancial systems
that can become clogged by illiquid securities (see, for example, Diamond and Rajan, 2008a,
and Brunnermeier, 2009). Hence, we employ the standard model of banking introduced
4Our model therefore applies to money market segments in which credit risk concerns play a role, namely
unsecured (term) markets and markets secured by risky collateral.
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by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) that allows consideration of the role of banks as liquidity
providers. A further advantage of this model is that it naturally creates a scope for interbank
markets (see Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987, and Bhattacharya and Fulghieri, 1994).5
Our paper analyzes the e¤ects of asymmetric information about credit risk on the func-
tioning and possible breakdown of the interbank market. In that respect, our work builds on
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and is related to Broecker (1990) and Flannery (1996) who also
examine the role of asymmetric information and credit risk. Freixas and Holthausen (2004)
study interbank market integration across countries when there is better information about
the solvency of domestic banks than of foreign banks.
Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2009) examine asymmetric information between short-
term and long-term investors. Longer-term investors, as potential buyers of assets, do not
know whether short-term investors sell because the asset failed to produce a return or be-
cause they need liquidity and the asset has not yet matured. Delaying the sale deepens
the information problem and adverse selection may ine¢ ciently accelerate asset liquidation.
They distinguish between outside and inside liquidity (asset sales versus cash), which con-
nects to our analysis where banks hold liquid and illiquid securities and the former can be
traded in exchange for risky claims on the latter. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) sim-
ilarly distinguish between market liquidity and funding liquidity. In our model, banks can
obtain funding liquidity in the interbank market by issuing claims on assets with limited
market liquidity.
In Diamond and Rajan (2009), illiquidity can depress lending and low prices for illiq-
uid assets go hand in hand with high returns on holding liquidity. They do not consider
asymmetric information. Instead, potential buyers may want to wait for asset prices to
decline further. At the same time, the managers of selling banks may want to gamble for
resurrection. These two e¤ects feed on each other and may lead to a market freeze.
Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) present a model of a market freeze without asymmetric
5An important complement to liquidity within the nancial sector is the demand and supply of liquidity
within the real sector (see Holmström and Tirole, 1998).
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information or counterparty risk. Banks can stop trading due to aggregate liquidity risk, i.e.
banks hold similar rather than o¤setting positions. Aggregate shortages are also examined
in Diamond and Rajan (2005) where bank failures can be contagious due to a shrinking of
the pool of available liquidity. Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) analyze systemic risk and
contagion in a nancial network and its ability to withstand the insolvency of one bank. In
Allen and Gale (2000), the nancial connections leading to contagion arise endogenously as
a means of insurance against liquidity shocks.
Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2008) and Freixas, Martin, and Skeie (2008) both
study rationales for central bank intervention in the interbank market. In Acharya et al.,
market power makes it possible for liquidity-rich banks to extract surplus from banks that
need liquidity. A central bank provides an outside option for the banks su¤ering from
such liquidity squeezes. In Freixas et al., multiple equilibria exist in interbank markets,
some of which are more e¢ cient than others. By steering interest rates, a central bank
can act as a coordination device for market participants and ensure that a more e¢ cient
equilibrium is reached. Freixas and Jorge (2008) examine how nancial imperfections in the
interbank market a¤ect the monetary policy transmission mechanism beyond the classical
money channel.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the setup of
the model. In Section 3, we derive and characterize the various interbank market regimes. In
Section 4, we discuss the empirical implications of the model and relate it to the developments
during the nancial crisis. In Section 5, we employ our model to discuss policy responses.
In Section 6, we o¤er concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
There are three dates, t = 0; 1; and 2, and a single homogeneous good that can be used for
consumption and investment. There is no discounting and no aggregate uncertainty.
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Consumers and banks. There is a [0; 1] continuum of consumers. Every consumer
has an endowment of 1 unit of the good at t = 0. Consumers are risk averse with twice
di¤erentiable concave utility functions. Ex ante, consumers are identical. As in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), some of them become impatientand only value consumption at t = 1
and some become patientand only value consumption at t = 2.
There is a [0; 1] continuum of risk neutral, prot maximizing banks. We assume that
the banking industry is perfectly competitive. Thus, banks make zero prots in equilibrium.
At date t = 0, consumers deposit their endowment with a bank in exchange for a demand
deposit contract which promises them consumption c1 if they withdraw at t = 1 or c2 if they
withdraw at t = 2. Deposits are fully insured by deposit insurance and no bank runs occur.
Liquidity shocks. Banks are uncertain about the liquidity demand they will face at
t = 1. For a fraction h of banks, a high fraction of consumers, denoted by h, is impatient
and wishes to withdraw at t = 1. The remaining fraction l = 1   h of banks faces a low
liquidity demand l, with l < h. The aggregate demand for liquidity at t = 1, denoted by
 = hh + ll, is known. Let the subscript k = l; h denote whether a bank faces a low or
high need for liquidity.
Assets and banksportfolio decision. Banks can invest the consumersendowment
at t = 0 in two types of real assets, a long-term illiquid asset and a short-term liquid asset.
Each unit invested in the liquid asset o¤ers a return equal to 1 after one period (costless
storage). Each unit invested in the illiquid asset yields an uncertain payo¤ at t = 2. The
illiquid asset can either succeed and return R or fail and return zero. In the latter case,
a bank is insolvent and it is taken over by the deposit insurance fund. Let I denote the
fraction invested in the illiquid asset at t = 0. The remaining fraction 1  I is invested in
the liquid asset.
Importantly, banks are uncertain about the riskiness of their illiquid investment when
they make their portfolio allocation at t = 0. With probability q, the illiquid investment
succeeds with probability ps and with probability 1  q, it succeeds with probability pr < ps.
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Let p denote the expected success probability: p = qps + (1   q)pr. Each bank becomes
privately informed about the risk of its illiquid investment at t = 1. While the overall
level of counterparty risk, p, is known, banks have private information whether their illiquid
investment is safer (ps > p) or riskier (pr < p) than expected. The uncertainty about liquidity
demand is assumed to be independent of the uncertainty about the risk of the illiquid asset.
Let the subscript  = s; r denote whether a banks illiquid asset is safer or riskier.
The investment in the illiquid asset is ex ante e¢ cient: pR > 1. This does not, however,
preclude an illiquid investment that turns out to be riskier than expected to be unprotable
ex post: prR < 1. Any fraction L of the illiquid investment can be converted into liquidity
using a private liquidation technology at t = 1, for a constant unit return of less than one
(costly liquidation). We interpret this broadly as a cost of accessing sources of funding
other than unsecured borrowing. We assume that safer investments are easier to convert
into liquidity, 1 > ls > lr.6 This structure makes riskier assets also more illiquid, a feature
particularly pronounced in the current crisis. In case prR < 1, we assume that prR > lr so
that even if the illiquid investment turns out to be riskier than expected, banks prefer to
keep it to maturity.
Bank face a trade-o¤ between liquidity and return when making their portfolio decision.
The illiquid asset is ex ante more productive but it is costly to convert it into liquidity at
t = 1.
Interbank market and liquidity management. Given that banks face di¤ering
liquidity demands at t = 1, an interbank market can develop. Banks with low withdrawals
by impatient consumers can lend any excess liquidity to banks with high early withdrawals.
Let Ll and Lh denote the amount lent and borrowed, respectively, and let r denote the
interest rate on interbank loans.7 We assume that the interbank market is competitive, i.e.
6For example, such a technology would allow to realize a constant fraction  of the illiquid assets expected
value: l = pR. Our results would be qualitatively unchanged if we instead assumed that a riskier illiquid
asset returns more, Rs < R < Rr, and that illiquid assets can be converted into liquidity at the same rate,
ls = lr = l. We show this in Appendix B. What is needed is that the opportunity cost of liquidation, Rl , is
higher for a riskier bank.
7Note that screening of borrowers is not possible in this set-up as all banks demand the same loan size
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banks act as price takers.
Due to the risk of the illiquid asset, a borrower as well as a lender in the interbank market
may be insolvent at t = 2 when the loan is repaid. A solvent borrower must always repay
his interbank loan. If his lender is insolvent, the repayment goes to the deposit insurance
fund. In contrast, a solvent lender is only repaid if his borrower is solvent, too.
In sum, a bank can manage its liquidity at t = 1 in three ways: 1) by borrowing/lending
in the interbank market, 2) by converting the illiquid asset into liquidity, and 3) by investing
in the liquid asset for another period.
The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 3 below.
-
timet=0 t=1 t=2
Banks o¤er deposit con-
tracts (c1; c2).
Banks invest into a risky
illiquid and a safe liquid as-
set.
Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks
and shocks to the risk of the
illiquid investment realized.
Banks borrow and lend in an
interbank market at an interest
rate r.
Additionally, they can convert
part of the illiquid asset into
liquidity and/or reinvest into
the liquid asset.
Impatient consumers withdraw
deposits and consume c1.
The return of the illiquid
asset realizes.
Interbank loans are re-
paid.
Patient consumers with-
draw their deposits and
consume c2.
Figure 3: The timing of events
3 Analysis
In this section we solve the model backwards by rst examining banksliquidity management
at t = 1 and then deriving the price of liquidity from banksportfolio allocation at t = 0.
We derive di¤erent regimes in the unsecured interbank market. First, there can be full
participation of borrowers and lenders in the market. Second, there can be adverse selection
and there is no readily available collateral they can pledge.
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in the unsecured market when borrowers with safer illiquid investments prefer to obtain
liquidity outside this money market segment. Third, the interbank market can break down
because supply dries up (liquidity hoarding by lenders) or because demand dries up (all
borrowers drop out). Which of the regimes occurs depends on the underlying parameters of
the model.
3.1 Regime I: Full participation of borrowers and lenders
In order to characterize the regime with full participation in the interbank market, we start
by assuming that there is indeed full participation and then verify for which parameters the
assumption is met.
Liquidity management. Having received liquidity shocks, k = l; h, and being privately
informed about the risk of their illiquid investment,  = s; r, banks need to manage their
liquidity at t = 1 in order to maximize prots at t = 2.






p[R(1  Ll;)I + Rl;((1  I) + Ll;I l) + p(1 + r)Ll;   (1  l)c2] s.t. (1)
lc1 + 
R
l;((1  I) + Ll;I l) + Ll;  (1  I) + Ll;I l:
A type-(l; ) bank has spare liquidity since the level of early withdrawals is low. The
bank can thus lend Ll; at a rate r in the interbank market. The bank can also reinvest a
fraction Rl; in the liquid asset. Finally, it can convert a fraction 
L
l; of its illiquid investment
into liquidity.
The budget constraint requires that the outow of liquidity at t = 1 (deposit withdrawals,
reinvestment into the liquid asset and interbank lending) be matched by the inow (return
on the liquid asset and liquidation proceeds).







p[R(1  Lh;)I + Rh;((1  I) + Lh;I l)  (1 + r)Lh;   (1  h)c2] s.t. (2)
hc1 + 
R
h;((1  I) + Lh;I l)  (1  I) + Lh;I l + Lh;:
A type-(h; ) bank has a liquidity shortage. It can borrow an amount Lh; in the interbank
market. It could also convert some of its illiquid asset into liquidity and reinvest into the
liquid asset.
There are two key di¤erences between the optimization problems of a lender and a bor-
rower. The rst di¤erence is in the objective function. A borrower expects having to repay
p(1+ r)Lh; while a lenders expects a repayment pp(1+ r)Ll;. A lender will not be repaid
if the illiquid investment of his counterparty fails. With full participation in the interbank
market, a lender expects his counterparty to be solvent and repay the interbank loan with
probability p = qps + (1  q)pr since he cannot distinguish safer and riskier borrowers. The
second di¤erence is in the budget constraint. The interbank loan is an outow for a lender
and an inow for a borrower.
We characterize banks liquidity management at t = 1 in a number steps. First, we
obtain the marginal value of liquidity from the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint,
denoted by k;.
Lemma 1 (Marginal value of liquidity I) With full participation in the interbank mar-
ket, the marginal value of liquidity is l; = pp(1 + r) for a lender and h; = p(1 + r) for
a borrower.
A lender values liquidity at t = 1 since he can lend it out at an expected return pp(1+r).
A borrower values liquidity since it saves the cost of borrowing in the interbank market,
p(1 + r). The marginal value of liquidity is lower for a lender because of counterparty risk.
The following result describes banksdecision to reinvest into the liquid asset.
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Lemma 2 (Liquid reinvestment I) With full participation in the interbank market, a
borrower does not reinvest in the liquid asset at t = 1: Rh; = 0. A lender does not reinvest
in the liquid asset if and only if p(1 + r)  1.
It cannot be optimal for a type-(h; ) bank to borrow in the interbank market at rate
1+ r and to reinvest the obtained liquidity in the liquid asset since it would yield a negative
net return. The same is not true for a lender since his rate of return on the lending in the
interbank market is only p(1+r) due to counterparty risk. But if a lender stores his liquidity
instead of lending it out, then the interbank market cannot be active.
To have full participation in the interbank market, borrowers must not convert long-term
investments into liquidity at t = 1. Otherwise, a borrower could never repay the interbank
loan. If he liquidates, he has no inows at t = 2 since he does not reinvest into the liquid
asset at t = 1 (Lemma 2). Knowing that, no bank would lend in the interbank market.
The next result characterizes banksdecision to convert illiquid investments into liquidity.
Lemma 3 (No liquidation I) With full participation in the interbank market, a borrower
does not convert his illiquid investment into liquidity if and only if 1+ r  R
l
. A lender does
not convert his illiquid investment into liquidity if and only if p(1 + r)  R
l
.
The decision depends on the benet of liquidation relative to its opportunity cost. The
benet is given by the expected return on an interbank loan. Is is lower for a lender due to
counterparty risk. The opportunity cost of liquidation, R
l
, is the rate at which the return on
the illiquid asset can be converted into liquidity at t = 1. The opportunity cost is higher for
a safer bank since its investment is easier to convert. It follows that i) safer banks convert
their illiquid investments into liquidity earlier, i.e. at lower interbank rates, than riskier ones,
and ii) borrowers convert earlier than lenders.
Banksliquidity management at t = 1 determines an interval of feasible interbank interest
rates.
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Proposition 1 (Feasible interbank loan rates I) There is full participation in the in-
terbank market if and only if the interbank interest rate satises:
1
p
 1 + r  R
ls
:
The lower bound on the interest rate is given by the participation constraint of lenders.
Their outside opportunity is to reinvest in the liquid asset. The upper bound is given by
the participation constraint of safer borrowers. Their outside opportunity is to convert
their illiquid investments into liquidity. Safer borrowers drop out of the unsecured interbank
market earlier than riskier ones since their illiquid investment is easier to convert. The upper
bound, unlike the lower one, depends on banksrisk type.
Pricing liquidity. At t = 0 banks decide how much to invest in the illiquid asset,
fraction I , in order to maximize expected prots. Recall that at t = 0 banks are identical
since the shocks to liquidity and to the riskiness of the illiquid asset have not yet realized.




I + p(1 + r)Ll   (1  l)c2] (3)
+ hp[R
I   (1 + r)Lh   (1  h)c2]
subject to
Ll = (1  I)  lc1 (4)
Lh = hc1   (1  I): (5)
where we have used the fact that Rk; = 
L
k; = 0 (Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and Proposition 1).
Since all banks are assumed to borrow or lend in the interbank market, Lk is given by the
budget constraint at t = 1. The amounts lent and borrowed are independent of the risk-type
of the illiquid investment, .
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The rst-order condition for a banks optimal portfolio allocation across the liquid and
illiquid assets requires that:8
hp(1 + r) + lpp(1 + r) = hpR + lpR
or, equivalently,
(h + lp)(1 + r) = R: (6)
The interbank interest rate r, the price of liquidity traded in the interbank market, is
given by a no-arbitrage condition. The right-hand side is the expected return from investing
an additional unit into the illiquid asset, R. The left-hand side is the expected return from
investing an additional unit into the liquid asset. With probability h, a bank will have a
shortage of liquidity at t = 1 and one more unit of the liquid asset saves on borrowing in
the interbank market at an expected cost of p(1+ r). With probability l, a bank will have
excess liquidity and one more unit of the liquid asset can be lent out at an expected return
pp(1 + r). Lendersexpected counterparty risk is the average probability of repayment at
t = 2 given that all borrowers participate in the interbank market, p = qps+(1  q)pr. Note
that banksown probability of being solvent at t = 2, p, cancels out in (6) since it a¤ects
the expected return on the liquid and the illiquid investment symmetrically.
We rewrite (6) as:







is the premium of lending in the interbank market due to counterparty risk. Liquidity
becomes more costly when i) there are fewer suppliers of liquidity (l = 1   h decreases),
8It is straightforward to show that a corner solution cannot be optimal. The protability of the illiq-
uid asset implies a strictly positive investment in it. The presence of liquidity shocks implies a non-zero
investment in the liquid asset.
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and ii) counterparty risk increases. Counterparty risk increases when is it less likely that the
illiquid investment turns out to be safer than expected (lower q) or when the probability of
success decreases (lower p).
The next result summarizes the discussion on the pricing of liquidity at t = 0, taking into
account the conditions obtained from the management of liquidity at t = 1 (Proposition 1).
Proposition 2 (Pricing I) There is full participation in the interbank market if and only





The interbank interest rate is given by 1 + r = R

.
Under full participation in the interbank, there is no impairment to market functioning
due to asymmetric information about counterparty risk. The price of liquidity reects the




Portfolio allocation. The amounts invested in the liquid and illiquid asset are de-
termined by market clearing in the interbank market and competition among banks for
deposits.
Proposition 3 (Illiquid investment I) With full participation in the interbank market,
the fraction invested in the illiquid asset is given by
I =
1    h(1  p)(1  h)
1  (1  )  h(1  p)(1  h)
: (9)







where  = h(1   p)(1   h). The relative amounts invested in the liquid and the illiquid
asset multiplied by the discount due to counterparty risk is equal to the relative outows at
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t = 1 and t = 2. Counterparty risk reduces the pay-out to depositors at t = 2 by an amount
 since some borrowers fail to repay their interbank loan.
It is easy to verify that, ceteris paribus, a bank chooses to hold a more liquid portfolio
if it expects a higher level of early withdrawals or if the probability of becoming a borrower
in the interbank market increases, i.e. I decreases in l, h, or h. Since the aggregate
demand for liquidity at t = 1, , is given by hh + (1  h)l, it follows that regardless
of the source of the increase in the aggregate liquidity demand, banks will invest less in the
illiquid asset.
It is useful to consider the benchmark case when there is no counterparty risk, p = 1.
Corollary 1 (First Best) Without counterparty risk, i) there is always full participation
in the interbank market, ii) the interest rate is equal to R, and iii) the fraction invested in
the illiquid asset is equal to expected amount of late withdrawals: IFB = 1  .
Without counterparty risk there is no friction in the economy. All banks participate in
the interbank market since lending is riskless and getting liquidity outside the unsecured
market is more costly. The amount invested in the liquid asset exactly covers the expected
amount of early withdrawals since the interbank market fully smoothes out the problem of
uneven demand for liquidity across banks. The fraction invested in the illiquid investment
exactly covers the expected amount of late withdrawals.9
3.2 Regime II: Adverse selection in the interbank market
The previous section analyzed the regime with full participation in the unsecured market. In
that regime, borrowers whose illiquid investment is safer than expected subsidize borrowers
whose illiquid investment turns out to be riskier. The subsidy becomes too costly when the




(Proposition 2). In this case,
the interest rate in the interbank market is so high that safer banks prefer to obtain their
9It is easy to see that the pay-out to impatient and patient depositors is cFB1 = 1, c
FB
2 = R, respectively.
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liquidity outside the unsecured market. Lenders therefore face an adverse selection of risky
borrowers.
We follow the same steps as in the previous section. We start by assuming that there
is adverse selection in the interbank market and then verify for which parameters there is
indeed adverse selection. As before, we rst examine banksliquidity management at t = 1
and then consider banksportfolio choice at t = 0.
Let rr denote the interest rate and Ir the fraction invested in the illiquid asset when
there is an adverse selection of risky borrowers in the interbank market.10 Lendersobjective
function t = 1 is the same as under full participation (equation (1)), except that the expected
return on the interbank loan is now pr(1+rr) instead of p(1+r). Borrowersexpected interest
repayment is now 1+rr instead of 1+r (as in equation (2)). The budget constraint of banks
active in the interbank market is unchanged. The analogue of Lemma 1 under adverse
selection is:
Lemma 4 (Marginal value of liquidity II) With adverse selection in the interbank mar-
ket, the marginal value of liquidity is l; = prp(1 + rr) for a lender and h;r = pr(1 + rr)
for a risky borrower.
Adverse selection a¤ects the marginal value of liquidity. It increases counterparty risk,
pr < p, and it changes the interest rate. We expect, and will conrm below, that the interest
rate under adverse selection is higher than with full participation, rr > r. As before, the
marginal value of liquidity is higher for borrowers than for lenders.
The changes in the marginal value of liquidity modify banksdecisions to reinvest in the
liquid asset and to convert the illiquid asset into liquidity.
Lemma 5 (Liquid reinvestment II) With adverse selection in the interbank market, a
risky borrower does not reinvest in the liquid asset at t = 1: Rh;r = 0. A lender does not
reinvest in the liquid asset if and only if pr(1 + rr)  1.
10For notational simplicity, we do not index by r the other choice variables.
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Lemma 6 (No liquidation II) With adverse selection in the interbank market, a risky
borrower does not convert his illiquid investment into liquidity if and only if (1 + rr)  Rlr .
A lender does not convert his illiquid investment into liquidity if and only if pr(1 + rr)  Rl .
As in the case with full participation in the interbank market, banksliquidity manage-
ment at t = 1 determines an interval of feasible interest rates under adverse selection.
Proposition 4 (Feasible interbank loan rates II) There is adverse selection in the in-
terbank market if and only if the interbank interest rate satises:
1
pr




Under adverse selection, the lower bound on the interest rate is higher than with full
participation (Proposition 1). Facing only risky borrowers, lendersoutside opportunity of
reinvesting in the liquid asset is more attractive. Since only riskier banks borrow, the upper
bound is also higher.
The portfolio allocation between the liquid and the illiquid asset at t = 0 determines again
the interest rate in the interbank market. Anticipating adverse selection in the interbank





r + pr(1 + rr)Ll   (1  l)c2]
+h(1  q)pr[RIr   (1 + rr)Lh   (1  h)c2]
11Lemma 6 implies that there can be two cases under adverse selection regime: 1) a case in which none of
the lenders convert illiquid investments into liquidity, pr (1 + rr)  Rls ; and 2) a case in which safer lenders
choose to convert their illiquid investments and to lend their excess liquidity in the interbank market,
R
ls
< pr (1 + rr) < 1 + rr  Rlr . We will focus on the former case as the other case does not add any new
features to the results. Moreover, it did not seem to play a central role in the interbank market developments
in the 2007-09 crisis. This is because liquidity hoarding, which we document above, cannot occur in this case:
pr (1 + rr) >
R
ls
> 1. We therefore proceed under the assumption that pr (1 + rr)  Rls , which is equivalent
to 1ls < pr
1
r




Ll = (1  Ir)  lc1
Lh = hc1   (1  Ir)
where we used the results in Lemma 5, Lemma 6 and Proposition 4. Compared to full
participation (equation (3)), banks objective function at t = 0 under adverse selection
di¤ers in two respects. First, the interest rate is given by rr instead of r. Second, a bank
expects not to participate in the unsecured interbank market if it receives a high liquidity
shock and if its illiquid investment is safer than expected. With probability hq, a bank
therefore gets liquidity by converting its illiquid asset. As before, the amounts lent and
borrowed per bank are denoted by Ll and Lh, respectively.
The rst-order condition for an optimal portfolio allocation under adverse selection is
given by:
(lppr + h(1  q)pr)(1 + rr) = (lp+ h(1  q)pr)R: (11)
Comparing (11) to the condition with full participation (6) shows that adverse selection
has two e¤ects on the price of liquidity in the interbank market. First, lenders get repaid
less often, pr < p. Second, composition of banks in the interbank market changes since only
riskier banks borrow, which is reected by the term h(1  q)pr.
We can rewrite the no-arbitrage condition (11) as:














Adverse selection a¤ects the risk premium in the interbank market 1
r
rst via higher coun-
19
terparty risk and second via the composition e¤ect . Higher counterparty risk (lower pr)
and a worse composition (lower ) both increase the risk premium. Adverse selection in
the interbank market therefore unambiguously increases the price of liquidity. The next
Proposition conrms our initial hypothesis.
Proposition 5 The interest rate under adverse selection, rr, is higher than the interest rate





The next Proposition summarizes the pricing of liquidity under adverse selection in the
interbank market.
Proposition 6 (Pricing II) When there is adverse selection in the interbank market, then





; and ii) the risk discount must be smaller than the expected return of the riskier
illiquid asset, r  prR. The interbank interest rate is given by 1 + rr = Rr .
3.3 Regime III: Breakdown of the interbank market
When the interest rate under adverse selection is outside the bounds imposed by Proposition
4, then there will be a breakdown of the unsecured interbank market. Liquidity will no longer
ow from banks with small liquidity shocks to banks with large liquidity shocks. The market
can break down either because lenders stop providing liquidity to an adverse selection of
borrowers (lack of supply) or because even risky banks nd it too expensive to borrow (lack
of demand).
Lack of supply. Adverse selection in the interbank market leads to a higher interest rate
(Proposition 5). But is the increase in the interest rate high enough to compensate lenders
for the larger counterparty risk when facing an adverse selection of borrowers? Lenders prefer
to hoard liquidity by reinvesting it in the liquid asset when the lower bound in Proposition
4 is violated:
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pr(1 + rr) < 1: (15)
The condition can also be written as in Proposition 6:
prR < r: (16)
Since r < 1, lenders only hoard liquidity if the illiquid investment not only turns out to
be riskier than expected, but it is also unprotable. Note that this is compatible with the
assumption about the ex ante e¢ ciency of the illiquid investment, pR > 1.
Lack of demand. Even riskier borrowers may choose to leave the unsecured market
segment if adverse selection drives up the interest rate too much. The upper bound on the







i.e. when the risk premium under adverse selection is higher than the illiquidity premium
for riskier borrowers (see Proposition 6).
4 Discussion and empirical implications
Depending on parameters, three di¤erent interbank market regimes can occur as a unique
equilibrium in our model: i) full participation and no impairment to the functioning of the
interbank market, ii) adverse selection and higher interest rates, and iii) market breakdown.
Figure 4 shows which regime occurs under di¤erent parameters for the average success proba-
bility, p, and the dispersion of risk, p  ps pr. Since banks have private information about
the risk of the illiquid asset, p is a measure of the severity of the asymmetric information
problem.







Figure 4: Comparative statics: Transition between regimes
interbank market (Regime I) regardless of the dispersion of counterparty risk. Asymmetric
information about the risk of illiquid assets does not impair the functioning of the interbank
market in this case. When average counterparty risk rises (p decreases), driving up the
interest rate in the interbank market beyond a certain threshold, safer banks with a liquidity
shortage prefer to obtain liquidity outside the unsecured interbank market. Only an adverse
selection of riskier banks keeps borrowing unsecured, causing the interest rate to increase
even further. Once there is adverse selection in the interbank market (Regime II), the
dispersion of counterparty risk matters. An increase in the dispersion of risk alone (higher
p), without an increase in the level of risk, can lead to a breakdown of the interbank market
and liquidity hoarding. Lenders prefer to keep liquidity instead of lending it out despite the
high rates borrowers would be willing to pay.
The arrow in Figure 4 depicts a change in the level and the dispersion of counterparty
risk and a corresponding transition between regimes that echoes the experience in interbank
markets before and during the nancial crisis of 2007-09. Three di¤erent phases described
in Figure 1, i.e. i) normal times, ii) elevated spreads but no recourse to the ECBs deposit
facility, and iii) further increase in spreads and substantial amounts deposited overnight
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with the ECB, resemble the di¤erent equilibria of our model: i) no impairment, ii) adverse
selection, and iii) liquidity hoarding. Moreover, the transition across regimes implies a
change in the underlying level and dispersion of counterparty risk that is consistent with the
development of actual events. First, the transition from Regime I to II occurs at the start of
the crisis in August 2007. At that time, subprime-mortgage backed securities were discovered
in portfolios of banks and bank-sponsored conduits (SIVs) leading to a reassessment of the
level of risk. The extent of exposures was unknown and counterparties could not distinguish
safe from risky banks. The transition from Regime II to III occurs at the moment of the
dramatic events surrounding the last weekend of September 2008 when the nancial crisis
spread outside the realm of investment banking and into the global nancial system.12 These
events can be interpreted as a further increase in the level, and importantly, in the dispersion
of counterparty risk making the adverse selection problem more severe.13 In the context of
our model, one can similarly view the e¤ect of the rescue of Bear Stearns as placing a lower
bound on the perceived probability of default of counterparties. But letting Lehman fail
then led to a drastic revision of expected default probabilities.
Since the possibility of a market breakdown due to a lack of supply is an important
feature of our model, we examine the empirical evidence on the hoarding of liquidity more
closely. The major developments at the time of the transition from Regime II to III are
depicted in relation to ows and stocks of liquidity using daily data in Figures 5 and 6. The
amounts deposited with the ECB start rising after the collapse of Washington Mutual, ten
days after the Lehman failure (September 15, 2008). Importantly, the rise precedes the ECB
announcement of a change in its tender procedure and standing facilities corridor on October
12Before the weekend of September 27-28, 2008 Washington Mutual, the largest S&L institution in the US
was seized by the FDIC and sold to JPMorgan Chase. At the same time, negotiations on the TARP rescue
package stalled in US Congress. Over the weekend, it was reported that British mortgage lender Bradford
& Bingley had to be rescued and Benelux announced the injection of e11.2 billion into Fortis Bank. On the
following Monday, Germany announced the rescue of Hypo Real Estate, and Iceland nationalized Glitnir.
13The fact that banks no longer trust each other amid perceptions that other banks are at risk of default
was also pointed out by market commentators at the time, see, for example, Central Banks Add Funds
to Money Markets,The Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2008 and Why the ECB Cant Fix Europe,
Business Week, October 8, 2008.
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8, 2008.14 In the week of September 29, 2008, the daily amounts of liquidity absorbed by
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3m Euribor - 3m Eonia swap
Recourse to deposit facility
Fine tuning (liq. absorbing)
Figure 5: Interbank spread, recourses to the ECB deposit facility, and liquidity-absorbing ne
tuning operations, 08/2008 - 11/2008
At exactly the same time as banks started to bring funds to the ECB, the average daily
volume in the overnight unsecured interbank market (Eonia) halved and the net amount of
central bank liquidity outstanding dropped signicantly (Figure 6).15 The net amount of
central bank liquidity outstanding is the total stock of liquidity provided minus the amount
absorbed in all open market operations and recourses to its standing facilities. The Figures
also show that although the ECB provided large amounts of liquidity (see the spikes in the
net stock of liquidity) throughout September 2008, banks were not depositing funds until
14As of October 9, the deposit facility rate was increased from 100 to 50 basis points below the policy rate,
thus making deposits relatively more attractive. The marginal lending facility rate was reduced from 100
to 50 basis points above the policy rate. Moreover, as from the operation settled on October 15, 2008, the
weekly main renancing operation is carried out through a xed rate tender procedure with full allotment
at the policy rate.
15At the onset of the crisis in August 2007, the Eonia saw an increase in volume. The average daily volume
was e40.91 billion in the year prior to August 9, 2007. It increased by 27%, to an average of e52.12 billion,
between August 9, 2007 and September 26, 2008. This increase could reect a substitution towards more
short-term nancing in the interbank market in Regime II as liquidity in longer-term segments of the market
dried up. The drop in overnight volumes of more than e29 billion observed at the end of September 2008 is
thus even more dramatic.
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the end of the month. Moreover, there is evidence that the set of banks participating in the
liquidity-absorbing operations of the ECB is not the same as the set of banks participating
in its liquidity-providing operations. It follows that, as of the last weekend of September




































































25.8. 1.9. 8.9. 15.9. 22.9. 29.9. 6.10.13.10.20.10.27.10. 3.11.
Net stock of liquidity outstanding
Eonia volume
Figure 6: Net stock of central bank liquidity outstanding (left scale) and overnight unsecured
market volumes (right scale), 08/2008 - 11/2008
If the interbank market su¤ers from a lack of supply, two further implications follow
from our model. First, a necessary condition for liquidity hoarding is that some banks are
insolvent, i.e. prR < 1 (see condition 16). Tackling the roots of the problem therefore
requires nding out who these banks are and recapitalizing (or closing) them. Indeed, the
US government and banking regulators are assessing banks risk and viability through a
comprehensive stress testingexercise since February 25, 2009. Second, increasing the rate
at which banks can park funds with the central bank reinforces liquidity hoarding. To see
this, consider an increase in the right-hand side of (15) from 1 to 1+ , where  is the interest
earned by depositing with the central bank. After increasing the deposit facility rate from
100 to 50 basis points below the policy rate on October 9, 2008, the ECB lowered it back to
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100 basis point on January 21, 2009.
When the unsecured interbank market is still functioning, albeit at elevated interest rates
(Regime II), our model implies that only an adverse selection of riskier banks is willing to
borrow at those rates. Safer banks have left the unsecured market since they have better
alternatives to obtain liquidity than riskier banks. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence
about the reluctance of banks to borrow at high rates since the onset of the crisis in order
to avoid signaling that they are bad banks. Moreover, there is evidence of tiering in
interbank markets consistent with our model where di¤erences in the risk of banksilliquid
assets translates into di¤erences in their alternatives to unsecured borrowing. With the
onset of the nancial crisis in August 2007, the spread between the rate in interbank market
secured by government bonds (Eurepo) and the rate of secured borrowing in ECB auctions
rose signicantly. Banks with high quality collateral could borrow more cheaply than banks
bidding in the ECB auctions where a larger set of collateral is accepted (Tapking and Weller,
2008).
Prior to September 2008 and in light of committed credit lines to SIVs, aggregate liquidity
risk, in addition to credit risk, was suggested as a reason for the high level of interbank
rates.16 We can readily conrm this reasoning in the context of our model by assessing the
e¤ects of an unanticipated aggregate liquidity shock on the interbank interest rate. Equation
(33) in the Appendix shows the equilibrium relation between banksportfolio allocation, the
interbank interest rate, and the parameters of the model. The interbank interest rate r rises
following an increase in any of the variables driving the aggregate demand for liquidity at
t = 1, . Either an increase in early withdrawals l or h, or an increase in the proportion of
banks facing larger than expected withdrawals, h; lead to higher rates. However, aggregate
liquidity risk by itself cannot explain why banks with su¢ cient liquidity refused to lend funds
in the market even at short maturities. Since the ECB moved to fully satisfy banksdemand
16A number of studies assess the relative importance of credit and liquidity risk in interbank interest rate
speads (see, for example, Taylor and Williams, 2009, and Schwarz, 2009). Acharya and Merrouche (2008)
establish a causal link between aggregate liquidity held by large settlement banks in the UK and interest
rates in secured and unsecured interbank markets.
26
for liquidity against a wide set of collateral and committed itself to uphold the full allotment
for a considerable amount of time, concerns about aggregate liquidity shortages are greatly
reduced (see also Taylor, 2009).
5 Policy responses
The aim of this section is to shed light on some of the policy responses that were discussed
or implemented in order to relieve the tensions observed in interbank markets since August
2007. We examine ve responses through the lens of our model: liquidity requirements,
market transparency, central bank liquidity provision, loan guarantees, and asset purchases.
5.1 Liquidity requirements
In the wake of the nancial crisis, bank regulators are investigating a strengthening of liq-
uidity requirements.17 These requirements are supposed to ensure that nancial institutions
are able to withstand liquidity stresses of varying magnitude and duration.
In our model, frictions in the market for liquidity are caused by asymmetric information.
Safer borrowing banks subsidize riskier banks since lenders cannot tell them apart. If this
subsidy becomes too large, safer banks prefer to obtain liquidity outside the unsecured
market. Lenders are then facing an adverse selection of borrowers that could result in the
hoarding of liquidity.
Requiring banks to hold liquidity bu¤ers can ensure that safer banks remain in the
unsecured market. Their participation guarantees a smooth functioning of the market.18 To
examine the argument in more detail, consider that absent the liquidity requirement, Regime
II (adverse selection) occurs. Ensuring full participation in the interbank market requires
17For instance, in December 2008, the UK Financial Services authority initiated a revision of liquidity
standards (FSA 2008). Similarly, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) issued a report
on appropriate liquidity risk management (CEBS, 2008). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is
also currently investigating strengthening of international standards on liquidity bu¤ers.
18A more straightforward justication of liquidity requirements would be that banks are forced to hold so
much liquidity that they no longer need to borrow in interbank markets.
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the interbank interest rate to be su¢ ciently low to bring back safer borrowers. If banks hold
more liquid asset, the price of liquidity in the interbank market decreases. Let rreq denote
the interest rate under liquidity requirements. It must satisfy (see Proposition 1):




Forcing banks to hold more liquid assets however means that they can invest less in the
protable illiquid asset. We therefore assume that a regulator sets the cap on the illiquid
investment, denoted by Ireq, in order to maximize the expected return on the aggregate
portfolio of the banking sector under full participation,





subject to the participation constraint of safe borrowers (17).
The following result characterizes the optimal liquidity requirement.
Proposition 7 (Liquidity requirements) Suppose that absent any regulation the inter-
bank market is in Regime II (adverse selection), ls > . Liquidity requirements in the form
of a cap on the illiquid investment can always ensure the participation of safer banks. Com-
pared to Regime I (full participation), there will be underinvestment in the illiquid investment,
Ireq < 
I . The corresponding interest rate is: 1 + rreq = Rls .





(1  Ireq) + Ireq

: (19)
There are two distortions: the depressed return on the liquid asset, 
ls
< 1, and the non-
optimal portfolio allocation, Ireq < 
I . The benet of liquidity requirements is that safer
banks with a liquidity shortage trade in the unsecured market and an adverse selection of
borrowers is avoided. The cost is that all banks are forced to hold more liquidity and forego
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part of the return on the illiquid investment. The benets are more likely to outweigh the
costs when the proportion of banks that need to nance themselves outside the unsecured
market is higher and when such nancing is costlier.
5.2 Transparency
Asymmetric information about the riskiness of the illiquid asset is at the heart of the ad-
verse selection problem in our model. A natural regulatory response is therefore to improve
transparency in the banking sector.19 If, for example, bank supervisors could assess banks
risk and communicate it to the market, then lenders would be able to distinguish safer and
riskier borrowers. Two markets would emerge, one for riskier banks with an interest rate,
rrtr, and one for safer banks with an interest rate, r
s
tr.
20 The following proposition states the
interest rates under market transparency:
Proposition 8 (Market transparency) Market transparency in the form of a regulator
assessing and publicly announcing the risk type  of banksilliquid investment, leads to the
interest rates (1 + rstr) =
p
ps




The two interest rates are determined by two no-arbitrageconditions. One condition
follows again from banksportfolio allocation at t = 0. The second condition requires that
in equilibrium, lenders are indi¤erent between lending to safer or riskier borrowers.
For market transparency to avoid adverse selection, the interest rate, rstr, must be low
enough to bring safer borrowers back to the interbank market:




19Increased transparency is a key recommendation of the de Larosière report, which examines the organi-
zation of supervision of nancial institutions and markets in the EU. Similar recommendations are made by
the UKs Turner Review and the Group of 30 Report by Paul Volcker.
20Assessing banksrisk is indeed the aim of the "stress testing" exercise undertaken by the US government
and banking regulators (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2009). Such an exercise can
also help to restore normal trading conditions in the interbank market by reducing the degree of asymmetric
information, p. Moreover, it can help to bring back the supply of funds that withdrew in fear of lending
to unprotable "lemons" (see 16)). Either the regulator is able to nd out which bank is unprotable and
close it down, or it can convince market participants that there are no such banks around.
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, which is possible since p
ps
< 1 and 
ls
< 1 when there
is adverse selection (Regime II).
Market transparency lowers the interest rate for safer banks in need of liquidity since
they are no longer pooled with riskier banks. But riskier banks will be charged a higher
interest rate. As long as:








, riskier banks participate in the interbank market. Again, this is
possible. Although p
pr
> 1, we also have that 
lr
> 1 since riskier banks would still borrow
in Regime II, lr < r <  (see Propositions 5 and 6). Market transparency thus enlarges the
set of parameters for which all types of borrowers participate in the interbank market.
Market transparency does not distort the price of liquidity. However, the drawback is
that it does not achieve full participation in the market when the conditions (20) and (21)
fail to hold. By contrast, liquidity requirements, while distorting, can always avert adverse
selection.
5.3 Liquidity provision by the central bank
A central bank can o¤er to provide liquidity directly to banks in need. Indeed, increased
liquidity provision was a common reaction by central banks around the world to the 2007-
2009 nancial crisis.21
Suppose that an unanticipated adverse shock to counterparty risk, p, moves the economy
from full participation (Regime I) to adverse selection (Regime II).22 Assuming that a central
21At the onset of the crisis on 9 August 2007, when overnight rates temporarily spiked up by 60 basis points,
the Eurosystem provided e94 billion of liquidity via collateralized, overnight lending. From August 2007
until September 2008, the Eurosystem was able to stabilize the overnight interbank rates without increasing
the aggregate supply of liquidity by adjusting the time path of its liquidity provision (frontloadingliquidity
within each maintenance period). From October 2008, it introduced a full allotment procedure in its market
operations which led to a signicant increase in the liquidity provision. As a result, the size of the ECBs
balance sheet temporarily increased by roughly e600 billion. The Federal Reserve introduced the Term
Auction Facility (TAF), which allowed the auctioning of term funds to all depository institutions. In early
2009, the outstanding volume in the TAF was almost $500 billion, and the total short-term liquidity provided
by the Federal Reserve to nancial institutions totalled around $850 billion (Bernanke 2009).
22Since we assume that the shock to counterparty risk is unanticipated, the regulatory response to the
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bank that has no informational advantage over the market, it has to o¤er liquidity to all
banks at the same rate, rCB. The highest rate at which safer banks are willing to borrow
from the central bank is:













which is positive since pR > 1 > ls. Even though the central bank lends at a subsidized rate,
it makes a prot. The reason is that a central bank can raise liquidity at unit cost. That is,
it can print money. In contrast, the private supply of liquidity is costly since banks have
to forgo investing in the illiquid asset if they want to be able to provide liquidity at t = 1.
Moreover, banks have to bear liquidity and counterparty risk. Condition (6) shows that the
cost of private liquidity is R

> R > 1:
If a central bank provides liquidity to banks with a liquidity shortage, then it crowds
out the private supply of liquidity. Banks with excess liquidity are no longer able to nd
a counterparty. In order to have a more balanced intervention, the central bank can o¤er
to take on the excess liquidity and, possibly, o¤er a return on it. The central bank would
e¤ectively become an intermediary. It would be the counterparty for all liquidity transactions
and replace the interbank market.23
A central bank can always provide liquidity at a lower cost than the interbank market.
This is true even without a crisis. While such an intervention may seem desirable ex post
(thus disregarding any moral hazard issues), it can have substantial costs. One important
consideration is the role of interbank markets in information aggregation, price discovery,
crisis is also unexpected. Thus, we abstract from moral hazard issues that can be an important consideration
when examining policy responses to crises (for a recent analysis see, e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2008b).
23See also Buiter (2008). As of October 15, 2008 the ECB is de facto intermediating: it fully satises
demand for liquidity in its weekly Main Renancing Operations and, at the same time, banks deposit
signicant amounts with the ECB (see also the discussion in section 4).
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and peer monitoring (see, for example, Rochet and Tirole, 1996).
5.4 Interbank loan guarantees
Several countries have introduced loan guarantees in order to revive the interbank market.24
Depending on their scope, loan guarantees reduce or even eliminate counterparty risk, thus
lowering the interbank interest rate and inducing safer banks to borrow again.
Consider rst the case of full interbank loan guarantees. Counterparty risk is eliminated
and all banks participate in the interbank market. The interest rate in the interbank market
is 1 + rFG = R, where rFG denotes the interest rate under full guarantees. The cost of this
intervention to the guarantor is
p (1 + rFG)hLh   (1 + rFG)hLh
or, equivalently,
 RhLh (1  p) : (22)
The guarantor has to pay for all losses due to the risk of the illiquid investment.
Consider next partial guarantees that increase the probability of repayment from p to p̂,
where p̂ is high enough to guarantee full participation in the interbank market:




and where rPG is the interest rate under partial loan guarantees.25 The cost to the guarantor
is:
p (1 + rG)hLh   p̂ (1 + rG)hLh
24One example is Italy, where the Banca dItalia and the owners of the e-Mid trading platform have
established the Mercato interbancario collateralizzato (MIC). Even though its trading activity is in principle
collateralized, the Banca dItalia guarantees timely repayment of all loans in MIC. The reason is that the
crisis also a¤ected secured interbank lending as there were credit risk concerns due to uncertain collateral
values.





hLh (p̂  p) : (23)
The following proposition shows that interbank loan guarantees should be su¢ ciently
comprehensive to be cost-e¢ cient for the public sector.
Proposition 9 (Partial guarantees) The cost of partial guarantees that yield an interest
rate just ensuring full participation, 1 + rPG = Rls , always exceeds the cost of full guarantees.
A guarantee covers both, principal and interest. While a partial guarantee reduces the
cost on the principal it increases the cost on the interest as the interest rate rises to com-
pensate lenders for the remaining counterparty risk.
5.5 Asset purchases
An alternative to borrowing in the interbank market is to convert the risky illiquid asset
into liquidity. One way to do this is to acquire high quality collateral that can be used in
the repo market or with central banks. Selling illiquid assets can be costly, l < 1 in the
context of our model. In a nancial crisis, this cost is particularly acute due to re-sale
prices. If banks bring more illiquid assets to the market than there are funds available to
buy them, the market will be characterized by cash-in-the-market pricing. In other words,
illiquid assets are particularly subject to market liquidity risk (as in, for example, Shleifer
and Vishny, 1992, Allen and Gale, 2004, or Gorton and Huang, 2004).
A central bank or a government authority does not face liquidity risk. Since liquidity risk
does not need to be priced in, they can o¤er to buy illiquid assets from banks at a higher
price, P > l.26 The price only needs to reect the credit risk of assets. Moreover, by setting
the price appropriately, the central bank or government can attract both safer and riskier
borrowers and take advantage of pooling assets.
26The Eurosystem has for example widened the set of eligible collateral for its renancing operations.
While the Federal Reserve cannot purchase assets other than Treasuries, agencies and agency MBS, the US
governement is purchasing assets via the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
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In particular, the price P could be set equal to the expected return on the illiquid asset,
pR. This ensures that the central bank or government do not su¤er losses on average.
Such pricing e¤ectively lowers the opportunity cost of liquidity to 1. This is benecial
for borrowers, who would otherwise have to pay a premium for obtaining liquidity in the
interbank market since they have to compensate lenders for counterparty risk.
6 Conclusion
Interbank markets underwent dramatic changes during the ongoing nancial crisis, with
interest rates rising to previously unseen levels and trading activity declining signicantly
in some market segments. Unsecured, longer-term interbank lending and lending secured
with risky collateral were particularly a¤ected. Motivated by these facts, we present a
model of the interbank market with asymmetric information about counterparty risk. We
show that depending on parameters, reecting in particular the level and distribution of
counterparty risk among banks, an equilibrium with full participation of borrowers and
lenders in the interbank market and the smooth reallocation of liquidity may not be reached.
The functioning of the interbank market can be impaired by adverse selection, possibly
leading to a market breakdown. The interbank market regimes obtained in the model echo
the developments prior to and during the nancial crisis of 2007-09.
Although a number of factors a¤ect banks decisions to trade in interbank markets,
our model highlights the role of counterparty risk as a necessary ingredient to explain the
qualitatively di¤erent phases observed in the interbank markets over the past two years.
At the same time, the asymmetry of information can rationalize the prolonged nature of
interbank market tensions despite an unprecedented liquidity provision by central banks.
The model can shed light on the e¤ects of various policy responses that were put in place
to relieve the tensions. It can help interpret a number of empirical issues. For example, the
model predicts that interbank market spreads can be higher than what would be implied
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solely by credit risk. The reason is that adverse selection has an amplifying e¤ect on spreads.
The model can be extended along a number of dimensions. In particular, potential spill-
overs between the secured and unsecured money market segments can be analyzed more
closely. What led to the signicant degree of interbank market segmentation observed since
the onset of the crisis? What determines the willingness of banks to pay at central bank
renancing operations? How broad should the list of eligible collateral be? These questions
are left for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let k;2 be the Lagrange multiplier on the feasibility constraint Lk;  0. The rst-order
condition for a type-(l; ) w.r.t. Ll; is:
pp(1 + r)  l; + l;2 = 0 (24)
while the rst-order condition for a type-(h; ) bank w.r.t. to Lh; is:
 p(1 + r) + h; + h;2 = 0: (25)
Since we assume that all banks borrow and lend in the interbank market, we have Lk; > 0 so
that k;2 = 0. Then (24) and (25) become:
pp(1 + r) = 
l;
p(1 + r) = 
h;:
Proof of Lemma 2
Let k;3 and 
k;
4 be the Lagrange multipliers on 0  Rk;  1. The rst-order condition for a
type-(k; ) bank w.r.t. to Rk; is:




4 = 0 (26)
Substituting h; = p(1 + r) (Lemma 1) into (26) yields:




4 < 0 (27)
since left hand side is negative. It cannot be zero since I = 1 and Lh; = 0 cannot be optimal. A
type-(h; ) bank would have to nance its entire need for liquidity by borrowing in the interbank
market at a rate r > 0 whereas it could just store some liquidity without cost using the
short-term asset. Since  h;3 + 
h;
4 < 0 we have 
R
h; = 0.
Consider now the case of a lender. Substituting l; = pp(1 + r) (Lemma 1) into (26) yields:





The rst term on the left hand side is negative since I = 1 and Ll; = 0 cannot be optimal. A
type-(l; ) bank cannot invest everything into the illiquid asset, not liquidate any part of it and
still lend in the interbank market. Hence, Rl; = 0 i¤ p(1 + r)  1 (we assume that a type-(l; )
bank does not reinvest into the liquid asset when the condition holds as an equality).
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Proof of Lemma 3
Let k;5 and 
k;
6 be the Lagrange multipliers on 0  Lk;  1. The rst-order condition for a
type-(k; ) bank w.r.t. to Lk; is:




6 = 0: (28)
Substituting h; = p(1 + r) and l; = pp(1 + r) (Lemma 1) and Rk; = 0 (Lemma 2 and the
assumption that there is full participation in the interbank market so that a type-(l; ) bank does
not reinvest into the liquid asset) into (28) yields:
 pI( R+ (1 + r)l) =  h;5 + 
h;
6
 pI( R+ p(1 + r)l) =  l;5 + 
l;
6 :
Since it cannot be optimal to invest nothing into the illiquid asset (if I = 0 then h;5 = 
h;
6 = 0
since they cannot both strictly positive, and thus Lk; 2 (0; 1), which contradicts that nothing was
invested into the illiquid asset), we have Lh; = 0 i¤ (1 + r)l  R and Ll; = 0 i¤ p(1 + r)l  R
(we assume that a bank does not convert illiquid investment into liquidity when the conditions
hold as an equality).
Proof of Proposition 1
First, if there is full participation in the interbank market, then banks with excess liquidity must
prefer to lend it out rather than reinvest it in the liquid asset. Lemma 2 gives the lower bound on
the feasible interest rate such that this is the case. Moreover, banks with a liquidity shortage
must prefer to obtain liquidity in the interbank market rather than by converting their illiquid
investments into liquidity. Lemma 3 gives the upper bounds on the feasible interest rate where
the lowest upper bound is given by a safer borrower since ls > lr.




participation in the market is not full. Since 1 + r  Rls <
R
lr
holds, we have, by Lemma 3, that
both types of borrowers prefer to obtain liquidity in the market rather than by converting illiquid
investments into liquidity. Since both types of borrowers are in the market, potential lenders face
an average counterparty risk p. Since p(1 + r)  1, we have, by Lemma 2, that expected return on
lending in the interbank market is higher than the return on reinvesting liquidity. Hence, both
type of lenders also participate in the market. Contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2
We need to check when the interest rate (equation (6)) is feasible under full participation
(Proposition 1). The lower bound requires that 1p 
R
 , or equivalently,   pR, which is always
satised since  < 1 and pR > 1. The upper bound is R 
R
ls
, which simplies to the condition in
the Proposition.




participation in the market is not full. By Proposition 1), the latter is equivalent to p(1 + r) < 1
or 1 + r > Rls , where 1 + r =
R
 . First inequality implies that pR <  < 1, a contradiction with the
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assumption pR > 1. Second inequality implies that R >
R
ls




contradiction with the condition in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
Using (4) and (5), market clearing in the interbank market, lLl = hLh, yields:
c1 = 1  I (29)
Since competition forces banks to pay out everything to depositors at t = 2, we have that:
(1  l)c2 = RI + p(1 + r)Ll (30)
for a lender and
(1  h)c2 = RI   (1 + r)Lh (31)
for a borrower. Eliminating c2 yields:
RI + p(1 + r)Ll
1  l
=
RI   (1 + r)Lh
1  h
: (32)
The per depositor outows for a lender and for a borrower have to be equal. This implies that an
increase in counterparty risk, p, reduces the amount invested in the illiquid asset, I , ceteris
paribus. In order to counter a decrease in p, a lender would increase I (left-hand side) but a
borrower would decrease I (right-hand side). Since borrowers have fewer late withdrawals,
1  h < 1  l, the negative borrower e¤ect prevails on a per depositor basis.
Using (4) and (5) to substitute for Ll and Lh in (32), eliminating c1 using (29), and solving for I















which simplies to the condition in the Proposition.
Proof of Corollary 1
Without counterparty risk, p = 1, there is no risk premium,  = 1, and no reduction in pay-out at
t = 2,  = 0. The Corollary follows immediately from propositions 2 and 3.
Proof of Lemma 4
See the proof of Lemma 1 and replacing r and p with rr and pr in (1) and (2). Type-h; s banks do
not participate in the interbank market.
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Proof of Lemma 5 and Lemma 6
See the proofs of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 using k; from Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 4
The lower bound on the feasible interest rate in the interbank market is given by Lemma 5. The
upper bound is given by Lemma 6.
To show su¢ ciency, assume that, contrary to the claim in the Proposition, the interbank interest
rate is smaller or equal to Rlr and yet there is no adverse selection in market. Then, there are two
possible cases: 1) either both types of borrowers participate in the market; or 2) none does. By
Lemma 3, both types of borrowers are in the market if and only if 1 + r  Rls . The interbank





we have that R >
R
ls
, a contradiction. By Lemma 6, there are no borrowers in the market
if and only if the interbank interest rate is above Rlr , a contradiction with the condition in the
Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5




where we used ps = pr +p and p = pr   pr. Using these expressions to substitute for ps and q
in (13) and using h = 1  l we can write r <  as:
pr( (1  l)(pr +p) + p((1  l)  lp))
 (1  l)pr(prp) + p(pr(1  l)  lp)
< lp+ (1  l)
where the right-hand side comes from (8). The condition holds if and only if
(1  p)(1  l)pr +p(1  (1  p)l) > 0;
which simplies to
l <






This always holds since the right-most expression is larger than 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
We need to check when the interest rate (equation (12)) is feasible under adverse selection
(Proposition 4). The lower bound requires that 1pr 
R
r




simplify to the conditions in the Proposition.
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Proof of Proposition 7
Choosing liquidity requirements that maximize the expected return on the aggregate portfolio of
the banking sector requires solving the following problem:
max
Ireq



















where the rst constraint is given by the condition on the interest rate (Proposition 1) and the
second constraint is given by the equilibrium relation between the illiquid investment and the
interest rate in Regime I (33).
Using (33) to substitute for 1 + rreq, and taking the rst-order condition yields:
pR




























implying that Ireq =
1  
1  +ls , 0  
I
req  1.










Since absent any regulation, participation in the interbank market would not be full, we have that
ls > . Thus, it must be that I > Ireq and the claim in the Proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 8





tr + qps(1 + r
s
tr)Ll + (1  q)pr(1 + rrtr)Ll   (1  l)c2]
+ hqps[R
I
tr   (1 + rstr)Lh   (1  h)c2]
+ h(1  q)pr[RItr   (1 + rrtr)Lh   (1  h)c2] s.t.
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Ll = (1  Itr)  lc1
Lh = hc1   (1  Itr):
The rst-order condition with respect to Itr yields:
lp[qps(1 + r
s
tr) + (1  q)pr(1 + rrtr)] + h[qps(1 + rstr) + (1  q)pr(1 + rrtr)] = pR: (35)
In equilibrium, lenders must be indi¤erent between lending to safer or riskier borrowers:
ps(1 + r
s
tr) = pr(1 + r
r
tr): (36)
Combining (35) and (36) results in the interest rates given in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 9
Comparing (23) and (22), we see that the cost of partial guarantees exceeds the cost of full




Since the participation constraint of safe borrowers is binding at the interest rate rPG, we know
that ls = p̂l + h (see Proposition 2). Thus, the condition above can be written as:
p̂l + h >
p̂  p
1  p;
which simplies to p̂ < 1 and hence the claim in the Proposition follows.
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Appendix B (not for publication)
In this Appendix, we show that the three regimes in the interbank market described above also
arise in a model in which the two types of long-term investments can be converted into liquidity
at the same rate but di¤er in their long-run returns. That is, we assume that Rs < R < Rr and
ls = lr = l < 1. We retain the assumption that safer investments are more likely succeed:
ps > p > pr where p = qps + (1  q) pr. Hence, safer investments are characterized by a lower
long-run return but a higher success probability than riskier investments. We let R denote the
expected t = 2 return on the illiquid investments: R  qpsRs + (1  q) prRr.
One possible interpretation of the liquidation technology is the ability to recover some of the
original investment made at t = 0. This is costly in that the liquidation return is lower per unit
than the original investment: l <1. By contrast, in the set-up developed above we interpret the
liquidation technology as the ability to gather some of the future returns on the long-term
investments already at t = 1. Since the long-run returns are not yet realized, this is costly: ls < 1
and lr < 1.
We derive di¤erent regimes in the interbank market: 1) full participation and no impairment to
market functioning; 2) adverse selection and higher interest rates; and 3) market breakdown. We
follow the same solution technique as before. We start with the decisions taken by the banks at
t = 1 and derive the price of liquidity from banksportfolio allocation at t =0.
Interbank market regimes
Having received liquidity shocks, k = l; h, and being privately informed about the risk of their
illiquid investment,  = s; r, banks need to manage their liquidity at t = 1 in order to maximize
















(1  I) + Ll;I l
i
+ Ll  (1  I) + Ll;I l [l1]
Ll  0 [l2]
0  Ll;  1 [l3; l4]
0  Rl;  1 [l5; l6]
(37)
















(1  I) + Lh;I l
i
 (1  I) + Lh;I l + Lh [h1 ]
Lh  0 [h2 ]
0  Lh;  1 [h3 ; h4 ]
0  Rh;  1 [h5 ; h6 ]
(38)
45
The rst-order conditions for a type-ls;r with respect to Ll; Ll and 
R
l are:
ps;rp(1 + r)  l1 + l2 = 0
 ps;rRs;rI + l1I l + l3   l4 = 0
ps;r(1  I)  l1(1  I) + l5   l6 = 0
Similarly, the rst-order conditions for a type-hs;r bank are given by:
 ps;r(1 + r) + h1 + h2 = 0
 ps;rRs;rI + h1I l + h3   h4 = 0
ps;r(1  I)  h1(1  I) + h5   h6 = 0
Regime I: Full participation of borrowers and lenders
Suppose there is full participation of borrowers and lenders in the interbank market. It is easy to
state the counterparts of the Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in this case. We have that the marginal
value of liquidity is l1 = ps;rp(1 + r) for a lender and 
h
1 = ps;r(1 + r) for a borrower. Also, a
borrowers does not reinvest in the liquid asset: Rh; = 0. A lender does not reinvest in the liquid
asset if and only if p (1 + r)  1:
Next, we consider the decisions to convert long-term investments into liquidity. Conditions are:
1 + r >
Rs;r
l
and p (1 + r) >
Rs;r
l
for banks in need of liquidity and those with excess liquidity, respectively (compare with Lemma








l holds so that safer banks in need of liquidity would be
the rst to convert their illiquid investments.
An interval of feasible interbank interest rates is thus:
1
p
 1 + r  Rs
l
, (39)
where the lower bound is given by the participation constraint of the lender and the upper bound
is given by the participation constraint of the safer borrower (see also Proposition 1).




I + lp [p(1 + r)Ll   (1  l)c2] (40)
+hR
I   hp[(1 + r)Lh + (1  h)c2]
where Ll = (1  I)  lc1 and Lh = hc1   (1  I). Taking rst-order condition with respect to
I yields:
(1 + r) =
R
p
where  = pl + h.




l must hold in Regime
I so that the opportunity cost of liquidation for safer borrowers are higher than the cost of
borrowing in the unsecured interbank market. Since Rs < R , the necessary condition is l < p .
Note that with full participation in the interbank market, the participation constraint of lenders
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p (compare to Proposition 2).
Regime II: Adverse selection of borrowers in the interbank market
This is the case in which only riskier banks in need of liquidity borrow in the interbank market
since safer banks nd the interest rate in the unsecured interbank market too high to pay. Hence,
we have that Lh;s = 0 and Lh;s = 1. Moreover, it must be that 0 < 
R
h;s < 1, otherwise type-h; s




6 = 0. It follows that
h;s1 = ps and 
h;s
2 = psr and the resource constraint of the type-h; s bank binds.
Next, we consider decisions to convert the long-term investments into liquidity. These are given
by:
1 + r >
Rr
l




It follows that an interval of feasible interbank interest rates under adverse selection is:
1
pr
 1 + r  Rr
l
. (41)
This is a counterpart of Proposition 4.
As in the analysis in the main text, there can be two cases in the adverse selection regime: 1) a




2) a case in which safer lenders choose to convert their illiquid investments and to lend excess
liquidity in the interbank market, 1 + r > Rsprl . We will focus on the former case as the other case
does not add any new features to the results. Moreover, it did not seem to play a central role in
the interbank market developments in the 2007-09 crisis. This is because liquidity hoarding,
which we document above, cannot occur in this case: pr (1 + r) > Rsl > 1 . We therefore proceed
under the assumption that pr (1 + r)  Rsl . A su¢ cient condition for this to hold is Rs > prRr,
i.e. getting the safer return Rs for sure is more protable the expected return on the riskier
investment, prRr.




I + lp (pr(1 + rr)Ll   (1  l)c2) (42)
h (1  q) pr

Rr
I   (1 + rr)Lh;r   (1  h)c2

where Ll = (1  I)  lc1 and Lh;r = hc1   (1  I). Taking the derivative with respect to I
and re-arranging, we get:
1 + rr =
lR+ h (1  q) prRr
pr [qlps + (1  q) (lpr + h)]
:
We now check under which conditions this is an equilibrium, i.e. 1pr  1 + rr 
Rr
l is satised. We
have that 1 + rr  1pr if and only if:
l [qps (Rs   1) + pr (1  q) (Rr   1)]  h (1  q) (1  prRr) :
Note that a su¢ cient condition is prRr > 1 since then the right-hand side is negative while the
47
left-hand side is positive. We have that 1 + rr  Rrl if and only if:
lR+ h (1  q) prRr




Regime III : Market breakdown
Lack of supply: Lenders prefer to hoard liquidity by reinvesting it in the liquid asset when the
lower bound in (41) is violated, i.e.
pr (1 + rr) < 1;
or, equivalently,
l [qps (Rs   1) + pr (1  q) (Rr   1)] < h (1  q) (1  prRr) :
Note that the necessary condition for this inequality to hold is that the expected return on the
riskier illiquid investment is ex ante unprotable: prRr < 1 . This is the same necessary condition
for liquidity hoarding to occur as the one obtained in the set-up considered in the main text.
Lack of demand: Risky borrowers choose to leave the unsecured interbank market if adverse
selection drives the interest rate up too much. The upper bound on the interest rate in (41) is
violated when:





lR+ h (1  q) prRr
qlps + (1  q) (lpr + h)
>
prRr
l
:
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